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Abstract
To improve access to maternal health services, Benin introduced in 2009 a user fee exemption
policy for caesarean sections. Similar to other low- and middle-income countries, its implementa-
tion showed mixed results. Our study aimed at understanding why and in which circumstances the
implementation of this policy in hospitals succeeded or failed. We adopted the realist evaluation
approach and tested the initial programme theory through a multiple embedded case study design.
We selected two hospitals with contrastive outcomes. We used data from 52 semi-structured inter-
views, a patient exit survey, a costing study of caesarean section and an analysis of financial flows.
In the analysis, we used the intervention-context-actor-mechanism-outcome configuration heuris-
tic. We identified two main causal pathways. First, in the state-owned hospital, which has a public-
oriented but administrative management system, and where citizens demand accountability
through various channels, the implementation process was effective. In the non-state-owned hos-
pital, managers were guided by organizational financial interests more than by the inherent social
value of the policy, there was a perceived lack of enforcement and the implementation was poor.
We found that trust, perceived coercion, adherence to policy goals, perceived financial incentives
and fairness in their allocation drive compliance, persuasion, positive responses to incentives and
self-efficacy at the operational level to generate the policy implementation outcomes. Compliance
with the policy depended on enforcement by hierarchical authority and bottom-up pressure.
Persuasion depended on the alignment of the policy with personal and organizational values.
Incentives may determine the adoption if they influence the local stakeholder’s revenue are
trustworthy and perceived as fairly allocated. Failure to anticipate the differential responses of
implementers will prevent the proper implementation of user fee exemption policies and similar
universal health coverage reforms.
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Introduction
Since more than a decade, universal health coverage (UHC) is a pri-
ority on the global health agenda (Horton and Das, 2015). World
Health Organization defines UHC as ensuring that ‘all people and
communities can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilita-
tive and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality to
be effective, while also ensuring that the use of these services does
not expose the user to financial hardship’ (World Health
Organization, 2015). The momentum for UHC coincides with a
growing consensus that user fees constitute a barrier to timely access
to life-saving interventions for vulnerable populations and may
cause financial hardship (Russell and Gilson, 1997; Richard et al.,
2008; Arsenault et al., 2013). In theory, user fee exemption policies
‘place an additional resource in people’s wallets. (. . .) It gives them
the opportunity to use public health services whenever they feel the
need, without being dissuaded by cost’ (Robert et al., 2017, p. 2).
The Lancet Commission on Investing in Health endorsed the pro-
gressive universalism approach defined as the ‘determination to in-
clude people who are poor from the beginning’ (Gwatkin and Ergo,
2011, p. 2161) in the pathway towards achieving UHC, and stated
this requires user fee exemption policies, either without (type one)
or with (type two) targeting of poor people (Jamison et al., 2015).
Several African countries introduced user fee exemption policies
for various health services since 2000 (Witter, 2010; Richard et al.,
2013; Dzakpasu et al., 2014), aiming at promoting equitable access
and decreasing catastrophic expenditure (Gilson et al., 2000;
Richard et al., 2008, 2013; Ridde, Haddad, et al., 2013; Dossou
et al., 2018). Most studies of the implementation of these policies
reported that patients continued to be charged fees. Poorly formu-
lated policies combined with insufficient or irregular reimburse-
ments contributed to providers keeping charging fees (Gilson and
McIntyre, 2005; Witter and Adjei, 2007; Agyepong and Nagai,
2011). Also the discretionary power of frontline workers has been
frequently reported as a major determinant of policy implementa-
tion (Walker and Gilson, 2004; Gilson and McIntyre, 2005; Witter
and Adjei, 2007; Agyepong and Nagai, 2011; Ben Ameur et al.,
2012; McPake et al., 2013; Ridde, Kouanda, et al., 2013). However,
little is known on when and why implementation of user fee exemp-
tion policies succeeds or fails.
Government of Benin introduced the user fee exemption policy
for caesarean section on 22 December 2008, targeting all pregnant
women requiring a caesarean section. It came officially into effect on
1 April 2009 and covered an intravenous infusion before referral, re-
ferral within the health district, consultation, hospitalization, surgery,
drugs, supplies and post-surgery check-up. A national agency (the
implementing agency) was created to manage the implementation
process. In 2013, 30 state-owned hospitals and 18 non-state-owned
hospitals were accredited for reimbursement under the policy.
Criteria for the accreditation of hospitals included the not-for-profit
status and the capacity to provide caesarean section. The state-owned
hospitals included all the hospitals, operating under the administra-
tive and technical supervision of the Ministry of Health (Présidence
de la République du Bénin, 2005). The non-state-owned hospitals
included facilities administratively independent from the Ministry of
Health (Présidence de la République du Bénin, 2005). All accredited
facilities received a fixed sum of XOF 100 000 (US$196) for each cae-
sarean section performed, regardless of their level and the actual costs
related to the services (Witter et al., 2016). In addition to the reim-
bursements, the Ministry of Health provided free kits of drugs and
consumables during the first year.
The FEMHealth research programme ran from January 2011 to
December 2013 and was funded under the Seventh Framework
Programme of the European Commission. It aimed at evaluating
user fee exemption policies for maternal health services in Mali,
Burkina Faso, Morocco and Benin. In Benin, FEMHealth focused on
the user fee exemption policies for caesarean section and demon-
strated variable implementation outcomes across seven hospitals.
Some hospitals provided five out of the eight items covered by the
policy for free, whereas other facilities provided only one. The me-
dian fees charged for a caesarean section varied between US$0 and
US$52 (Centre de Recherche en Reproduction Humaine et en
Démographie, 2014; Dossou et al., 2018). In this article, we present
the results of a study that aimed at understanding why and in which
circumstances the implementation of the fee exemption policy suc-
ceeded or failed. With this study, we aim to reduce the literature gap
on the implementation of user fee exemption policies in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs). We expect the evidence gener-
ated will be relevant for makers, implementers and evaluators of
user fee exemption policies and of other UHC policies in LMICs.
Methods
We adopted the realist evaluation approach, which is a particular
form of theory-driven evaluation (Stern et al., 2012), is rooted in
realist philosophy of science. At its centre is the notion of generative
causation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Wong et al., 2016) which
makes it particularly adapted to study complex problems
(Westhorp, 2013; Bamberger et al., 2016), including in health policy
and system research (Gilson, 2012; Adams et al., 2016). The vari-
able implementation of the user fee exemption policy for caesarean
section across hospitals is best considered as a complex problem.
Indeed, policies are implemented in health systems which are best
understood as open systems. Policy implementation is likely to be
influenced by existing and new health policies but also by other
Key Messages
• The implementation of the user fee exemption policy for caesarean section may result in mixed outcomes at hospital
level within the same country because of contextual factors such as the ownership of the facility, the organizational
objectives of the facility, the commitment of managers, the management of health providers, the existence of channels
for community voice and of means for exercising that voice.
• The implementation outcome of such policies may be generated by different mechanisms, including trust, perceived co-
ercion, intrinsic adherence to the goals and values of the policy, perceived individual or organizational financial gains
provided by the policy and the perceived fairness in the resources allocation.
• The policymakers should consider strategically which mix of mechanisms they need to trigger in which contexts for a
successful implementation of user fee exemption policies or other similar health-financing reforms for universal health
coverage.
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political, economic and social events. Many actors are involved,
from various positions and with specific interests and ideas about
the policy (Van Belle et al., 2017). All these point to the complex na-
ture of the causal processes underlying the outcomes of the policy.
Realist approach demands the researcher to make explicit the causal
mechanisms that explain the observed outcomes and its variation
(McLaughlin, 1987; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Pawson, 2004; Wong
et al., 2016). Realist evaluation indeed considers that it is not the
policy, but the actors who are engaged in it who bring about the
results, situated as they are in specific contexts. Policies work (or
not) because actors make particular decisions in response to the
resources or opportunities that the policy provides. Realist evalua-
tors thus aim at identifying the underlying ‘reasoning and resources’
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 68) or generative mechanisms that ex-
plain how the outcomes were brought about and in which condi-
tions (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). As such, realist evaluation fits
policy implementation research well: it allows for exploring not
only the policy formulation and priority-setting process, but also—
like in our research question—how and why actors, within the or-
ganizational setting and in the broader societal context, implement
policies (or not; Marchal et al., 2018). In the following paragraphs,
we present the development of the initial programme theory, the
study design used to test it, and the methods to collect, to analyse
the data and to refine the initial programme theory.
Development and formulation of the initial programme
theory
Realist evaluation starts with eliciting the initial programme theory of
the intervention in question (Marchal et al., 2012). The initial pro-
gramme theory can be considered as the hypothesis that posits how
and why a particular intervention would lead to specific outcomes,
for whom and in which conditions. Often, the initial programme the-
ory is based on the results of literature reviews. We started with the
berry-picking method to explore the field, followed by a non-
systematic review of the policy implementation literature. Berry-
picking approach is appropriate for identifying elements of the initial
programme theory (Finfgeld-Connett and Johnson, 2013). Like realist
synthesis (Pawson et al., 2005), the berry-picking method is an itera-
tive, adaptive, creative and flexible process that can contribute to gen-
erate a theory that explains a social phenomenon by consolidating or
federating fragmented pieces of the literature (Booth, 2008). The first
step is a literature search, followed by the selection of a first set of
articles relevant to the research question. Analysis of the selected pub-
lications leads to the reformulation of the research question, which in
turn is followed by a second search and so forth until the synthesis of
the results adequately answers the research questions (Booth, 2008).
First, we searched for frameworks, models or theories that could in-
form our initial programme theory. We reviewed papers dealing with
the implementation of user fee exemption policies for maternal
healthcare and healthcare in general. We found that most publica-
tions describe policy implementation gaps and factors that may ex-
plain implementation failure, like inadequate inputs and poor
communication (Witter and Adjei, 2007; Agyepong and Nagai,
2011). Few studies started from an explicit theory or theoretical
framework on policy adoption or implementation. Few authors
attempted to explain the success or failure of the policy implementa-
tion by using theories or models from political science (public admin-
istration and policy analysis). Authors like Ridde and Diarra (2009)
and Walker and Gilson (2004) used the concept of street-level bureau-
cracy (Lipsky, 1980) to explain the implementation gap of user fee
exemption policies. However, none of the papers referred to the
broader policy implementation literature.
The scant results of the first review led us to review the policy
implementation literature. Given the limited consensus on policy im-
plementation theories (O’Toole, 2004; DeGroff and Cargo, 2009), a
systematic review was not likely to be useful. We, therefore, carried
out a non-systematic review of the published and grey literature. We
started the search using the Web of Science and Social Sciences
Citation Index search engines with sets of keywords combining ‘pol-
icy’, ‘program’ and ‘implementation’ or ‘adoption’. We used exten-
sive snowballing to track down the original papers and books from
the bibliographic references of the initial list of papers and books.
This review identified a first set of three publications. We
selected the paper of Berman on macro- and micro-implementation
of social policy (Berman, 1978) because it presents a comprehensive
model, going from policy design to local implementation and back,
and it emphasizes the multi-level nature of policy implementation.
Second, we selected Elmore’s forward and backward mapping
model (Elmore, 1982). This model identifies local agents as key
actors in policy implementation and provides an advanced frame-
work for successful ‘planning’ of policy implementation, from the
first choices to the expected outcomes (forward mapping) and back
(backward mapping). Third, we added the ambiguity-conflict model
of policy implementation of Matland, because it represents a theory
explaining implementation gaps that goes beyond the top-down and
bottom-up divide (Matland, 1995).
At this stage, we extracted from those papers, the contents
related to intervention (in casu policy), context, actors, mechanisms
and outcomes, using the Intervention-Context-Actor-Mechanism-
Outcome (ICAMO) heuristic to identify the configurations that ex-
plain the reported outcomes at each level (Van Belle, 2014; Marchal
et al., 2018). ICAMO is a modified version of the context-
mechanism-outcome configuration (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) that
stimulates a proper description of the actual intervention and ‘the
actors through whom the intervention works’ (Mukumbang et al.,
2018). This process pointed us to three ‘passages’ or implementation
phases (Berman, 1978, p. 13) that provided the overall multilevel
structure of our initial programme theory:
Phase 1: This phase includes the actual decision-making process
and the institution of a programme to implement the policy. It
involves macro-level key stakeholders, including the ministers’
council, and results in making the decisions for the policy and its
financing. Next, an administration or government agency is set
up to develop a programme to implement the policy decision.
The more ambiguous the policy intent, the more latitude such
agency has in shaping the policy.
Phase 2: This phase encompasses the transition from programme
to local adoption at operational health service level, during
which slippage between programme guidelines and actual imple-
mentation can occur. This is partly determined by the degree of
compliance with decisions by higher authorities (and thus the en-
forcement capacity) and alignment of the policy goals with local
needs. Programmes are actually or symbolically adopted by
district health authorities and hospital managers.
Phase 3: This phase concerns the implementation of the pro-
gramme by service providers, who act as street-level bureaucrats.
Berman calls this ‘micro-implementation’ and considers this ‘may
be the most pivotal step because a social policy’s outcome
depends on local delivery’ (Berman, 1978, p. 21). Service
providers can implement the policy in four ways: (1) non-
implementation, (2) co-optation (or adaptation of the
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programme to fit existing practices), (3) technological learning
(adaptation of routine practices to accommodate the policy) and
(4) mutual adaptation, whereby both policy and service delivery
are adapted to ensure optimal fit. In previous studies, Berman
found that only mutual adaptation leads to achievement of the
intended policy outcomes: the policy is adapted to the organiza-
tion, its staff, its target public and its environment, and organiza-
tional changes are made to better implement the policy.
If the three papers provided an overarching architecture for a
multi-level analysis of policy implementation, they did not present
mechanisms. Our berry-picking approach led to the ‘carrots, sticks
and sermons’ typology of policy instruments (Bemelmans-Videc and
Vedung, 1998). Carrots, sticks and sermons can be considered as a
parsimonious typology of mechanisms underlying policy instru-
ments and more specifically as categories of drivers of individual or
organizational commitment to the policy. Policies that include
incentives (‘carrots’) may induce a positive response when actors
perceive a financial or other gain, or if any financial losses due to
the policy are compensated properly (net benefit or no net loss).
Policies that are based on coercion and sanctions (‘sticks’) may in-
duce perceived pressure and fear of sanctions that in turn may gener-
ate compliance. Policies based on persuasion (‘sermons’) trigger
good implementation if the actors perceive an alignment between
personal believes and policy goals and values. Figure 1 presents our
initial programme theory.
Study design
We adopted the multiple embedded case study design (Yin, 2009),
which is well adapted to research on policy implementation gaps. We
defined ‘the policy implementation’ as the case. We considered a hos-
pital implementing the user fee exemption policy for caesarean section
as the unit of analysis. Two units of analysis were purposively selected
among the seven implementing hospitals covered by the FEMHealth
research programme in Benin—a faith-based (non-state-owned) hos-
pital and a public (state-owned) hospital—because they present con-
trasts in terms of ownership, location and policy implementation
outcomes (Table 1). A detailed description of the sampling procedure
of FEMHealth is reported elsewhere (FEMHealth, 2014).
Data collection methods
Realist evaluation is method-neutral: the data collection methods
should allow to gather data needed to test the initial programme the-
ory. We collected both quantitative and qualitative data to describe
the case and its units of analysis. Table 2 presents the data sources,
tools and their specific purposes. A multi-disciplinary team (a medic-
al doctor, a health economist and a social scientist) collected the
data between March 2012 and March 2013.
Data analysis and refinement of the initial programme
theory
We transcribed verbatim the recordings of the interviews and
entered the transcripts in QSR NVIVO 10, converted later to QSR
Policy
Programme designed by the 
Ministry of Health and implemented  
by the Implementing Agency
Adoption of the programme









The programme is adopted (O) if effective 
top-down and/or bottom-up enforcement 
induces facility managers to fear sanctions 
(M) and thus make them comply 
(intermediate outcome).
The programme is adopted (O) by facility 
managers (A), if operational instructions are 
feasible and clearly communicated (I), if 
managers are persuaded and feel personally 
aligned with the values and goals of the policy 
resources (I) to compensate the potential losses, 
and if managers (A) respond positively to the 
incentives (M) provided by the policy.
Programme
 not adopted
Managers may not adopt or co-opt the 
programme (O). These scenarios are 
more likely to happen if there is a 
cognitive dissonance (M) with the 
local organisational goals and if there 
is a poor top-down or bottom-up 
enforcement (C).
The health workers may implement 
appropriate practices (O) if they 
have the appropriate competence 
(C) and perceive the appropriate 
rewards to do so (M).
Sub-optimal 
Implementation
The programme may be adapted 
by local managers (O) if there is   
room of improvement in the 
programme (I), if managers (A) 
have appropriate decision 
spaces (C) and if managers are 
persuaded and feel personally 
aligned with the values and 
goals of the policy (M).
I = Intervention; C = Context; A = Actor; M = Mechanism; O = Outcome; PO = Proximal Outcome
Figure 1 Initial programme theory.
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NVIVO 12. In a first phase, we adopted thematic analysis principles
(Miles and Huberman, 1984), whereby the initial coding was based
on the key elements of the initial programme theory, which evolved
during the analytical process. We used Microsoft Excel 2011 (ver-
sion 14.6.7) to do a univariate descriptive analysis of the quantita-
tive data from the exit survey and from the financial flow tracking
study. Table 2 presents the analytical approach used for each type of
data.
In a second phase, we triangulated qualitative and quantitative
data to develop a configurational analysis of each case using the
ICAMO heuristic tool (Van Belle, 2014; Marchal et al., 2018). We
described the intervention (in casu policy), context, actors, mecha-
nisms and outcomes, and identified the configurations that explain
the reported outcomes at each level. We mapped the causal config-
uration looking for causal links between the actually implemented
intervention, relevant contextual elements, the mechanisms that
were triggered for specific groups of actors and the observed out-
comes. Mechanisms are key components in this heuristic and we
defined them as the reasoning of the actors in response to the resour-
ces or opportunities and changes in the context introduced by the
intervention (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). We used a retroductive
mode of inference in which the researcher starts from the events
observed to postulate the conditions without which those events
cannot exist (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013; Robert et al., 2017;
Mukumbang et al., 2018). At this stage, the results from the qualita-
tive data analysis were combined with quantitative data from the
costing study and the assessment of the policy outcomes.
Once the in-case analysis was finished, we conducted a cross-
case analysis to compare the configurations. This allowed us to chal-
lenge the initial programme theory, look for alternative explanations
and refine the PT, using the ‘If . . ., then . . ., because . . . ’ statements
(Van Belle, 2014).
Ethical considerations
The Benin National Committee for Health Ethics (ref. 0792/MS/
DC/SGM/DFRS/SRAO/SA) in 2012, and the respective research eth-
ics committee of the authors’ institutes approved this study. We
obtained a written authorization to conduct the study from the
Ministry of Health of Benin but also written consent from the man-
agers of each unit of analysis. All the interviewees signed an
informed consent form before the interviews. All the materials are
stored for confidentiality and the findings are reported
anonymously.
Results
In this section, we present the results of the two hospitals, describing
the implementation outcome and the respective responses of the
actors: the adoption of the policy by the managers, the response of
the providers and the perceptions of the community. We present a
synthesis of the ICAMO of both hospitals.
The faith-based hospital
Implementation outcome
In the faith-based hospital, the median fee paid by users for a caesar-
ean section amounted to US$53 (min. US$50; max. US$149). Out of
the eight items of the policy package, only the post-surgery check-up
was fully exempted.
Adoption of the policy by the hospital management team
This hospital was accredited as an implementing facility in
December 2008. Six weeks after the official launch of the policy on
1 April 2009, the hospital managers started implementing it. We
found that managers of this facility felt they were not properly
engaged in the policy design process and that their concerns were
not properly addressed. Managers also reported that they did not
trust government to timely reimburse the US$196 for each caesarean
section as stated in the official policy documents. Managers justified
this mistrust by previous experience with government:
We used to exempt some user fees for civil servants affiliated to
the national health insurance scheme, but the state never reim-
bursed us. So, when we received the information [to implement
the fee exemption policy], we were a little bit hesitant. We waited
for other facilities to start. We started after seeing that the reim-
bursement was effectively following (Hospital manager, 2012).
Our financial flow tracking study showed that up to December
2011, this facility was reimbursed US$205 800, corresponding to
1050 caesarean sections. Our respondents declared that it took be-
tween a few days and 3 months after submitting the claims to receive
the reimbursements.
Several reasons were given for not fully adopting the policy. The
managers perceived the fixed amount of US$196 insufficient and un-
fair. Yet, the analysis of the costing data showed that the median
production cost of a caesarean section (including all the direct costs)
was US$50 (min. US$41; max. US$76). User fee charged in this hos-
pital before the policy was US$180. Managers argued that their re-
imbursement rate should be higher than that for the state-owned
Table 1. General characteristic of the two units of analysis in 2011
Parameters The faith-based hospital The State-owned or public hospital
Owner A Christian religious organization State
Population in catchment area (2011) 299 407 247 028
Monetary poverty index in the region
of the catchment area (2011)
(Biaou et al., 2015)
25.43% 46.07%
Type of hospital First referral hospital, non-district hospital First referral hospital, district hospital
Location Urban area Semi-rural
Number of beds (2011) 23 80
Key staff of the maternity (2011) 1 gynaecologist,3 midwives 1 gynaecologist,3 midwives
Wards/units Surgery, medicine, gynaecology,
paediatrics, laboratory
Surgery, medicine, gynaecology, paediatrics,
laboratory, radiography service
Number of CSs in 2011 over the number
of deliveries (percentage)
529/879 (60%) 259/1079 (24%)
Source: Administrative records of the hospitals and Biaou et al. (2015).
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facilities where public subsidies cover some recurrent expenditure.
They, therefore, decided to systematically charge patients an add-
itional fee of US$39. Non-exemption of consultation fees was
explained as follows:
Even when a pregnant woman later undergoes a caesarean sec-
tion in the facility, she has to pay the consultation fee before
being admitted to the hospital. (. . .) since you cannot predict if
the woman will undergo a caesarean section or not, and thus if
she has to be exempted for the consultation fee or not.
Gynaecologists are very strict on this point, because their income
depends on this (Hospital manager, 2012).
In this hospital, gynaecologists receive 5–10% of the fee of each
caesarean section they perform. To receive this fee, they have to pre-
sent a proof of payment of the additional US$39 fee to the adminis-
tration. Gynaecologist declared they have to ask actively women to
pay the fee and collect the proofs they can show to the administra-
tion. Users declared they feel constant pressure from health workers
to pay the additional fee.
In addition to the reimbursements, the Ministry of Health pro-
vided free kits of drugs and consumables during the first year of the
policy. Kits were issued to the maternity, where they were used for
patients who paid the additional fee. The managers interpreted the
provision of kits as a permanent measure. When it ended in March
2010, they considered this an important loss of resources and they
started charging users all the post-operative care, on top of the add-
itional US$39 additional fee. They reported this change to the imple-
menting agency during a supervision visit. The agency expressed its
dissatisfaction and issued an injunction to start implementing the
policy as requested.
There are pre-anaesthesia consultations that we charge the
patients for and that was noticed by the implementing agency
when they visited the hospital. They were angry, they really
shouted, even in front of patients (Health worker, faith-based
hospital, 2012).
The managers, however, did not adhere to the injunction. We
found that the managers as well as the providers perceived the hier-
archical power of the Ministry of Health as weaker than that of the
religious organization owning this hospital. We found that the latter
controls the management of the hospital through the appointment
of the managers, the recruitment of the staff and the validation of
the budget.
The response of the providers
The providers reported that they adopted the package of the policy
only partially. It emerged from the interviews that communication
between managers and providers was limited. Providers expressed
their feeling that their managers had a laisser-faire attitude about
the policy. Providers said they received little organizational or super-
vision support as illustrated by the following quote:
(When the implementing agency staff were critical), the managers
did not support us. The gynaecologist who was supposed to be
responsible of everything related to caesarean sections was
blamed for all that went wrong (Health worker, faith-based hos-
pital, 2012).
The supervision visits from the implementing agency were ir-
regular and health providers perceived these visits merely as a con-
trol of prescription of drugs and consumables. They felt the visits
did not help them in finding solutions to the problems they faced in
implementation.
Some policy beneficiaries reported in interviews that providers
charged them for certain services related to caesarean sections with-
out bill. Providers also reported that they had margins of freedom in
the policy implementation that allowed them for instance to pre-
scribe drugs or consumables that were out-of-stock or missing in the
kit. As a result, patients had to purchase these items either outside of
the facility in private pharmacies or inside the facility (informally
from certain providers) as reported in the following quote:
We sell our products. We prescribe certain drugs. When users
buy them, (. . .) we use them. When they don’t find them, we help
them. Usually this applies to hyperbaric bupivacaine or spinal
needles. In the last three months, there was no ephedrine at the
Essential Drugs Purchasing Centre, nor on the market, but we
have our own supply chains (Health worker, faith-based hos-
pital, 2012).
We found that there was little if any contestation of these practi-
ces by patients.
The view of the community
The community representatives in the district health committee
(Comité de Santé) reported in interviews that they had little know-
ledge about the policy and were not much engaged in it. The com-
mittee is supposed to ensure participation of all stakeholders in local
health governance as prescribed by decree N 2005-611 of 28-09-
2005 (Présidence de la République du Bénin, 2005). Yet, in 2012, 3
years after the start of the policy, some key members of the commit-
tee reported they were still not aware that the hospital was receiving
government funding to implement the policy. Consequently, the
community representatives mentioned they did not exert pressure on
the managers nor on providers to exempt all fees as requested by the
policy.
Our interviews also showed that some patients did not know
that the policy applied to this hospital when they were admitted.
They reported also not knowing the exact package of exempted
services and how the hospital implemented this.
Managers, providers, users and community representatives
reported there were no formal channels, such as complaints proce-
dures, for patients to engage with the management team. Patients
who were still charged fees did not actively engage with local health
managers, hospital managers nor providers to demand the policy to
be implemented. When asked why, patients mentioned they per-
ceived this facility as a faith-based hospital that provides quality
care inspired by religious, social and humanitarian values, and that
they trusted the management team.
Synthesis of the findings in the faith-based hospital
At this hospital, patients still paid for a caesarean section after the
policy was formally adopted by the management team. In actual
practice, the managers did not implement the policy as requested:
mistrust in the state, concerns about financial survival of the facility,
perceived unfairness in the relative allocation of resources to state-
owned and non-state-owned hospitals, and the weak perceived top-
down and bottom-up pressure to implement the policy contributed
to their decision. Poor communication, poor organizational and
supervision support, and a laisser-faire attitude contributed to health
professionals exploiting opportunities to charge informal fees that
impacted negatively on policy outcome. Figure 2 presents the
ICAMO configuration that summarizes the findings.









niversity user on 18 January 2021
The state-owned hospital
Implementation outcome
In this hospital, patients were fully exempted for five of the eight
items of the caesarean section package. The median user fee for this
package amounted to US$7 (min. US$0.2; max. US$59).
Adoption of the policy by the management team
Managers of this hospital applied the policy on 3 April 2009, 2 days
after its official launch. The hospital director was involved in the
technical workshops organiszed during the development phase of
the policy. He perceived the policy as supporting his vision to
Mechanism
Low adherence to the policy goals and 
loss; Poor perceived pressure to 
implement appropriate practices
Proximal outcome 1 
Managers co-opt the 
programme and distort the 
Context
Non-state owned hospital; Urban area 
with a monetary poverty index at 25%; 
the recurrent costs
Policy
 Initiated by Government;
US$196 per caesarean section 
timely reimbursed to hospital, 
drugs and consumables (kits) 
effectively provided to the hospital 
for 1 year
Proximal outcome 2
Providers carry out the distorted 
package and continue charging 
formal and informal user fees 
Managers 
Recruited and paid by the hospitals owner; 
Experience low public administration (top-
down) and community (bottom-up) 
pressures; Consider the state as an 
unreliable purchaser; Management practices 
Users 
Higher willingness/capacity to pay; 
Trust the providers; Poorly informed 
about the programme; No formal 
channels to voice  complaints
Providers
No civil servants; Recruited and paid 
by hospitals owner and managers; 
Payment based on quantity of services 
provided
Context
Inadequate organizational and 
laissez-faire
attitude about the programme 
Distal outcome 
Women undergoing caesarean 
section still pay substantial formal and 
informal fees (US$53 [min US$50; 
max US$149]) 
Mechanisms
Mistrust in the state; Poor intrinsic 
adherence to the goals and values of the 
co-opting the programme; Weak perceived 
pressure to adopt the programme
Figure 2 ICAMO configuration in the faith-based hospital.
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increase financial accessibility of the hospital. He took active meas-
ures to facilitate its implementation, as explained by a manager of
this facility:
We have sensitized healthcare providers and the community. (. . .)
We started exploring what to put in place to prevent the failure
of the policy, for instance, by ensuring a sufficient stock of rehy-
dration fluids for a minimum of six months (. . .) Our vision was
that if the government is out of breath, we should be able to con-
tinue (Manager, the state-owned hospital, 2012).
The managers used radio programmes as well as informal communi-
cation channels to inform the community about the policy. They
simplified the message to facilitate the communication: ‘Caesarean
sections are fully free’.
In this facility, managers are civil servants who are recruited,
appointed and paid by government. They expressed how the power
of the hierarchy within the Ministry of Health made them imple-
ment the policy. The perceived power of the community added to
this pressure:
The population has been widely informed that the caesarean sec-
tion is free and it is difficult to say now “Me, I will not start
implementing the policy”. (. . .) Since the Provincial Health
Director knows that the caesarean section is free, if a woman
complains that the facility asked her to pay, as a manager, you
will have to explain why (Manager, the state-owned hospital,
2012).
The managers considered the guidelines of the implementing agency
regarding reimbursement as useful. Managers felt effectively sup-
ported by the implementing agency and this helped in accelerating
the reimbursement. Our financial flow tracking study showed that
up to December 2011, this facility was reimbursed US$134 652 for
the 687 caesarean sections it performed.
Response of the providers
In the interviews, providers declared that the hospital management
team effectively supported them in the implementation of the policy,
for instance with the regular supply of the maternity unit with the
caesarean section kits. Managers reported that when they anticipate
a shortage of key products of the kits, they give priority to the free
caesarean section policy and stop supplying other wards. Women
reported that usually they did not have to buy drug in private phar-
macies, except when presenting with complications. For instance, in
case of meconium-stained amniotic fluid, providers reported that
the staff ask families to buy an infusion of metronidazole and cef-
triaxone. We found that some non-official fees were charged in the
operating theatre and in the post-operative room. For instance, pro-
viders proposed selling pain-relieving drugs to women suffering
from post-operative pain.
When the effect of anaesthesia waned, we started feeling uncom-
fortable and women started crying from everywhere. We were
obliged to call the midwives and beg them and ask if they would
not have a drug that can reduce our pain. They replied [the man-
agers] said caesarean section is free, and if we want a pain relief,
we must pay for it. Then we begged them to put something in
our infusion (Patient, state-owned hospital, 2012).
Both managers and providers reported that the management team
did not tolerate such practices. Managers reported that they applied
two measures when they found out: the confiscation of drug stocks
belonging to staff and the reimbursement of the users who com-
plained. The implementing agency’s team, which conducts supervi-
sion visits, sometimes participated in seizing drugs from staff.
The view of the community
The district health committee includes community representatives
who play a leadership role in the management of the hospital, which
is considered by the local communities as ‘our hospital’. The com-
mittee meets at least three times per year. In interviews, members of
this committee reported the policy was a major event for them: they
were informed about the policy and closely communicated with the
community to inform them.
Managers, providers and users reported the perceived financial
gain from the policy was very important, and the population had
high expectations of the policy. Managers explained that living in a
semi-rural area, the population had few choices in terms of care pro-
viders. As their capacity to pay was low, the high financial burden
of a caesarean section and the consequences were important, and
the perceived gain from the exemption was very important for them.
Not only users and community representatives but also managers
mentioned there were multiple opportunities to express complaints.
In constituency meetings with local politicians, they could express
their (dis)satisfaction by giving a mark to the public health facilities.
Local radio stations provided space for complaints through anonym-
ous phone calls. However, women found it difficult to lodge com-
plaints against staff as long as they were hospitalized, as they feared
retaliation.
Synthesis of the findings in the state-owned hospital
In this public hospital, patients undergoing a caesarean section still
paid formal and informal fees but far less than in the non-state-
owned hospital. Managers adopted five out of the eight items of the
policy package. They were motivated by their involvement in the de-
velopment of the policy and by the alignment with their values and
principles, but as civil servants, they also felt forced to implement
the policy. They actively informed the public and made efforts to
support their providers in the implementation. As a result, they
adhered to the policy goals. The providers, as civil servants, com-
plied with the policy, and felt actively supported by their managers.
The community and users had high expectations of the policy and
had channels to raise complaints, exerting bottom-up pressure on
providers and managers. Figure 3 presents the ICAMO
configuration.
Discussion
With this study, we aimed to explain the diverging outcomes in two
hospitals where the policy was implemented. We focused on the
meso- and micro-level of implementation. Several factors were at
play in the adoption of the policy, including alignment with personal
and organizational goals and values, financial motivation and en-
forcement. We found new elements not included in our initial pro-
gramme theory: trust and perceived fairness of the resource
allocation. A somehow surprising finding was that the faith-based
hospital did not correctly implement the policy, to the detriment of
the patients and against the generally assumed value set of such
organizations (Olivier et al., 2015). This section is organized around
the plausible mechanisms identified, how they operate to generate
the outcomes with regards to the resources provided by the
policy, the actors and the context? We discuss the strengths and lim-
its of the study and end with the refined programme theory.
Trust
In the faith-based hospital, there was mistrust of government before
the introduction of the policy, which resulted from previous negative
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experiences with government. This initial mistrust diminished when
hospital managers were reassured by the adequacy and timely provi-
sion of the kits and the dependability of the reimbursements. This
made them feel capable of partially implementing the policy without
incurring financial losses. This explanation is consistent with the
theory of planned behaviour, according to which individuals are un-
likely to develop a strong intention to act and behave in a certain
way, if they think they do not have the resources and opportunities
to do so, even if they have a positive attitude towards the behaviour
in question and if that behaviour would be supported by subjective
Mechanism
Strong perceived top-down and 
bottom-up pressure to adopt the 
programme; Fear of administrative 
and community penalties if not 
adopting the programme; Adherence 
to the policy goals and values




State-owned hospital in a semi-
rural area with a monetary poverty 
index at 46%; Receive public funds 
to cover recurrent costs from 
multiple mechanisms
Policy
 Initiated by Government;
US$196 per caesarean section 
timely reimbursed to hospital, 
drugs and consumables (kits) 
effectively provided to the hospital 
for 1 year
Charging of           
informal  fees
Distal outcome 
Women undergoing caesarean 
section pay some fees but 
relatively little (a median amount of 
US$ 7) [Min US$ 0.2; Max US$ 59]
Implementation of  nearly full 
Mechanism
Fear of administrative and 
community penalties if not 
implementing the policy 
Context
Strong perceived hierarchical 
pressure 
Managers
Civil servants; Managed 
through bureaucratic 
hierarchical administrative 
system; Pre-existing high 
commitment toward affordable 
access to health care
Users
Low willingness/capacity to 
pay; High expectation from the 
policy; Strong feeling of 
ownership of the hospital and 




Perceive opportunities to 
charge informal fees and have 
Providers




Various channels for community voice
Figure 3 ICAMO configuration in the state-owned hospital.
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norms (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). For policy implementation, this
means administrative injunctions and new norms are unlikely to be
adopted if implementers feel they are not enabled to carry it out.
Erasmus et al. (2017) reported organizational trust is a soft compo-
nent of systems that policymakers usually overlook but that influen-
ces policy implementation.
Perceived coercion
We found that the policy was better implemented where the per-
ceived pressure was high, either generated through top-down bur-
eaucratic hierarchy or through bottom-up community voice. This
pressure depended on the ownership: it was high in the state-owned
hospital and low in the faith-based organization, where the author-
ity of the implementing agency was not sufficient to effectively co-
erce the hospital management team to correctly implement the
policy. The implementing agency did not develop a holistic and stra-
tegic approach to the accredited facilities (Dossou et al., 2018). In
the faith-based hospital, the authority of the Ministry of Health, and
thus of the implementing agency, was further weakened by the per-
ception of the state as an unreliable partner.
This calls for further attention to the enforcement capacities of
the state. In most LMICs, governments work with mixed health ser-
vice delivery platforms to deliver UHC (Wadge et al., 2017). In
Benin, for instance, five faith-based or association-run hospitals are
appointed as district hospitals (Health System 20/20, 2012).
However, the governance of such public–private engagements chal-
lenges the traditional bureaucratic public administration approaches
(Health System 20/20, 2012; SHOPS Project and Inc., 2013;
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). In Benin, the Ministry of Health is re-
sponsible for governing non-state-owned hospitals, but in practice,
its interventions are mainly focused on the initial accreditation.
Monitoring, supervision and training are limited and inconsistent.
In Benin and elsewhere in Africa, a key issue is how to balance an ef-
fective regulatory framework with the managerial autonomy—con-
sidered as a key strength—of the non-state-owned facilities
(Boulenger and Criel, 2012). State-owned and non-state-owned
facilities differ in terms of organizational culture, organizational val-
ues, structures and funding. Influence of such differences on the im-
plementation of public health policies remains to be properly
addressed in research and policymaking.
The perceived pressure can result also from an active commu-
nity. Effective governance of local health systems calls for empow-
ered communities capable to raise their voice, claim their rights and
hold all providers accountable (Rifkin et al., 1988; Rifkin, 1996;
Kenny et al., 2015). In practice, strategies to improve public ac-
countability are often lacking (Van Belle and Mayhew, 2016).
Beyond effectively informing the key stakeholders, including the
public, and providing formal access to complaint channels, public
accountability is a complex process with specific challenges: frag-
mentation of actions and actors, conflicts of interests, diverging val-
ues, and different management and accountability practices (Van
Belle and Mayhew, 2016). These structural dimensions have to be
addressed properly to prevent, for instance, the persistent informal
payments in Benin.
Intrinsic adherence to the goals and values of the policy
We found that the management team can play a critical role by
ensuring a good fit between policy and organizational context. Its
commitment to the policy can be triggered by persuasion.
Persuasion as a governance instrument is extensively documented in
political sciences (O’Keefe, 2015), with the core idea that the lines
of authority are getting increasingly blurred and that ‘in such an en-
vironment, persuasion skills exert far greater influence over others’
behaviour than formal power structures do’ (Cialdini, 2001, p. 72).
In our study sites, government’s capacity of persuasion was differ-
ent. In the public hospital, the policy’s aim of abolishing user fees
clashed with the pro-user fee attitude dominating the Ministry of
Health (Dossou et al., 2018). Because the faith-based hospital relied
heavily on revenue raised by user fees, the policy contradicted the
core organizational goal of survival of the hospital. This leads to
cognitive dissonance (Cooper, 2007) at various levels. It explains at
least in part why managers kept charging formal fees to users,
whereas providers continued charging informal fees.
Response to the financial incentives and perceived
fairness of the resource allocation
The response to the financial incentive within the policy influenced
its adoption and the practices of providers. We found that in the
faith-based hospital, the perceived financial opportunities made
managers to adopt the policy once they saw that the reimbursements
were effective and timely. Indeed, the amount reimbursed is 16 US$
higher than the previous tariff charged in this hospital. The accumu-
lated payment of the caesarean section fees at the end of a given
period provides a saving fund that increases the investment capaci-
ties and constitutes a buffer against loss of revenue due to unpaid
bills. However, perceived fairness of the allocation of resources
influenced their adoption, too. Indeed, a perceived unfairness of al-
location in the sense of a perceived lower subsidy to faith-based hos-
pitals counteracted to some extent the perceived benefit. Perceived
fairness was not part of our initial programme theory.
Using incentives to change health systems in LMICs has gained
prominence in the last 20 years with various models of result-based
financing programmes (Meessen et al., 2011; Soucat et al., 2017).
The World Health Organization considers those programmes as a
step towards strategic purchasing that encompasses a wide range of
governance instruments beyond incentives (World Health
Organization, 2018). Our study provides empirical evidence that
incentives operate differently in function of the context. Response to
incentives may be informed not only by what providers believe to
gain individually but also by the comparison with the perceived ben-
efits of other similar providers.
Strengths and limitations of the study
The realist approach does not link validity to the use of particular
methods or tools, but to the coherence between the research object-
ive, the methods used to achieve it, the context and the conclusions
(Maxwell, 2012). Maxwell (2012) suggested three dimensions (de-
scriptive, interpretive and theoretical validity) to assess the trust-
worthiness of the plausible explanations of a social phenomenon
offered by a particular study. Regarding descriptive validity, for in-
stance, we relied for the description of the context, the practices and
the events on data from different sources, including national policy
managers, local managers, providers, users and community repre-
sentatives in district health committees, policy documents and rou-
tine data. One of the limitations of this study is that we did not
collect data from other groups such as non-users of the selected hos-
pitals, health providers from other wards or the leaders of the reli-
gious organization that owns the faith-based hospital. We attempted
to offset this limitation by collecting a wide range of data in order to
triangulate findings. A second limitation is that the data we used
have been mainly collected in 2012 and 2013 and that the policy
context has changed in the meantime. The larger doctoral study of
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which this article presents some results deals in detail with the
changing policy context. To answer the research questions of this
study, we believe the temporality plays a lesser role.
The refined programme theory
The section below presents the refined programme theory (see also
Figure 4).
At the meso and micro-level of the policy implementation chain,
the managers of the hospital, and the providers have to adopt the pol-
icy. Actual implementation requires the providers to align their practi-
ces with the goals of the policy. To be adopted and micro-
implemented properly, the policy will have to trigger mechanisms
such as trust, perceived pressure, positive response to financial incen-
tives, perceived fairness in the resources allocation and an intrinsic ad-
herence to the policy goals and values in the right mix. Furthermore,
the working environment has to be conducive for implementation.
For both managers and providers to adopt the policy and effect-
ively enable its implementation in their hospital, a number of inter-
mediary outcomes need to be achieved.
Compliance is achieved by the perceived pressure that derives
from the enforcement of ‘authority’. Hierarchy is an important fac-
tor for enforcement and can be enacted through direct command,
supervision, control, auditing or the overall accountability
procedures. Compliance can also be enforced by the community and
users through two components: having a voice (being informed and
having effective channels to express their voice) and using that voice
(actively expressing voice). The sensitivity of managers and pro-
viders to such enforcement depends on their perception on how ac-
countable they have to be towards their hierarchy (upwards
accountability) and citizens (downwards accountability) and thus on
the degree of pressure exerted on them. Enforcement can be counter-
acted by perceptions of threats to vested interests, such as institu-
tional survival or informal generation of revenue.
Extrinsic motivation can drive both adoption and micro-
implementation. It may be generated by financial incentives. Policies
that increase personal or institutional financial gains are more likely
to be adopted, but perceived fairness in the allocation of the resour-
ces between the parties beyond the net personal financial gains can
play a role, too. The perceived financial gains will more likely oper-
ate in organizations with lower financial margins and depend on the
trust the implementer has in the policy promotor.
Persuasion is effective when the implementers adhere to the policy
goals because they became policy champions. The latter will more
likely adapt both the policy and the context for an optimal policy im-
plementation. Participation of implementers in the policymaking pro-
cess can contribute to persuade them, enhance coherence of the policy





Adoption of the programme




Programme designed by the 
Ministry of Health and implemented  
by the Implementing Agency
Mutual adaptation 
of the context and the policy










Beyond the adoption, health workers (A) may 
correctly implement the programme (O) if they have 
appropriate competences (A) and appropriate 
resources timely available at the point of delivery (I).
Co-optation:
Adapt the policy
to fit the existing context
Policy
Managers (A) adopt the programme (0) if they feel forced to do so 
(M1), if they perceive resources provided by the programme as 
if managers feel in line with the goals and values of the policy (M5). 
Enforcement (M1) leads to compliance (PO) and is triggered in 
settings with strong hierarchical authority, with users and a 
community that have and express their voice (C) and managers 
sensitive to upward and downward accountability (A). M2, M3, and 
of managers (A). M5 is triggered by an appropriate communication, 
leading to persuasion (PO). Clear information and practical feasibility 
(I) enhance adoption (O). 
Managers (A) may mutually adapt the 
programme and the context if they can 
identify the changes needed in the 
programme (I) and in the context (C) to 
ensure the policy achieves its goals while 
maintaining its values. This requires 
managers (A) to align with those goals and 
values (M), to feel capable to do so (self-
decision spaces (C).
Managers may not adopt or co-opt the programme 
(O). These scenarios are more likely to happen if 
there is a mis-alignment (M) with the local 
pressure to comply (M) as there is a poor top-down or 
bottom-up enforcement (C) or if if the programme is 
facility (M).  
Providers (A) adopt the programme (0) if they feel forced to do so - 
they feel in line with the goals and values of the policy (M). 
Enforcement generates compliance (PO) and is triggered in settings 
with strong hierarchical authority, with a community and users that 
have and express their voice(C) and providers sensitive to upward 
and downward accountability (A). The expectation of personal 
policy goals and values is triggered by an appropriate communication 
(I) and leads to persuasion (PO). Clear information and practical 
feasibility (I) enhance adoption (O). 
I = Intervention; C = Context; A = Actor; M = Mechanism; O = Outcome; PO = Proximal Outcome
Figure 4 Refined programme theory.
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Effective implementation needs the required resources, including
drugs, supplies and information, to be timely available at the point
of delivery and a general conducive work setting. These measures, if
they are implemented consistently, reinforce trust and enhance the
self-efficacy of implementers.
Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of the refined pro-
gramme theory.
Conclusions
In Benin, the user fee exemption policy had different implementation
outcomes. In the hospitals we studied, contextual factors, including
ownership of the facility, organizational objectives, commitment of
managers, the management of health providers and the existence of
channels for community voice and for exercising that voice trans-
formed the same inputs into contrasting outcomes. In LMICs, trust,
perceived coercion, adherence to the policy goals, perceived finan-
cial incentives and fairness in their allocation need to be tactically
used for a successful implementation of user fee exemption poli-
cies—or similar health-financing reforms for UHC—in mixed (state-
owned and non-state-owned) delivery platforms.
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